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from secured credit?
No:.lt's a populist craving for a 
petit bourgeois valhalla
By James J. White
n 1996, Professr Elimllctth WAan-ci mladle a proposal to tihe American Law
In1situte and the D afting Com m ittee fo l o r rt set.,
Iaside" for unsecured claimants. As I undIenstand it, her prolv~sal w_~
amend Section 9-301 of'Aiic 9 (the sction that now implicitly sub-
ordinates a lien credioor to a pior perfected secured creditor).
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Under her iroposal, a creditor with
a judicial lien would be e, o itled to 20
percent of the collateral of prior per-
fected securted creditors. Indeed, each
sIcceecling lien creditor wocilc be enti-
tied to 20 percent of the remaining col-
lateral after earlier claimants had taken
their portion. Thus, if a secured credi-
tor had a perfected seccirity interest Ill
oil worth $100 million and had loaned
$100 million, a single-jciclgment crecdi-
tor with a claim in excess of $20 mil-
lion would be entitled to $20 million
OUt Of the collateral. If there were two
creditors, each with a $20 million
claim, the first would le entitled to 2.0
percent of the $ 100 million, tle sec-
oncd would be enititled to $ 16 Million
(20 percent of the remainder).
The intended beneficiaries of this are
tort claimants, erinployees, ei\'irolllei-
tal-pollution clainlatits aid other "ion-
adjusting" crelitors. Accorciig to
Prolessor \Vooclwarcl, trade creditors and
Other cinsecured connmercial lenders are
not the intended beneficiaries or are, at
most, incidental beneficiaries.
The iclea appeals to an ancient,
romantic notion that there should
always be a small sIppler o Iree assets
o the licimngry who cannot or (1o not
feed themselves. Persons (like me)
who are uiinIovcd by poiulist idclolo-
gy are cocliutful.
To analyze the mecits of the propos-
al1, consider three cLuestions:
* Is there a probler and if so,
what?
* Assuiniig a proilem, w\'ill the 20
percent set asid cure it?
o I the 20 percent set aside will cute
or at least alleviate the prolilem, does the
ibenelit conferred justil)' its cost?
Accoring to Prolcssor \Voodward
and nIlost ol the other proponeits, the
limr)[Ciln to Ile cucd does riot deal with
Ctoract creclitd;rs (suppliers, trade
\White is (I profssor dit i11 c li\t'rlsitV o
Michignl Law School ill Alm Arbor.
creditors, junior secured creditors and
the like) hecause lhey are presumed to
know about security interests and to
understandl that secured creditors who
have filed first will come ahead of
dhcm. They should charge accordingly
To the extent that one believes trade
creditors and tile like need help fiorn
the legislature and are incapable of or
unwilling to protect themselves, one
might advocate the \\1irren proposal as
protection for trade and other financial
creditors. In my opinion, tle proposal
cannot be .justified on that basis.
In some ways, trade creditors are
the smartest, most agile and clever of
all the creditors and I see no reason
Wvhy legislators should protect them
from the consequenccs of their own
actions. They can and routinely do
decide whether to lend and, if they
lend, what to charge. Aln expansive
secured credit system of the kind now
embodied in Article 9 is simply one ol
the things they must consider.
According to Prolessor \Voodward,
the problem lies elsewhere; that tort
creditors, elployees and elvironnien-
tal-pollution claimants and their fellow
travelers (all "nomadjusting" creditors)
will go unpaid. I low many tori or
cnvironlenltal clai ants go iulipaid?
Surely there are [alois enVil roninlental
cases and there are double.'ss a Il'w
mass tort claimnants that go unl)aid. In
the mOstl notoritLis tomi-induced batnk-
ruptcics., Manville and Robins, most or
all ol the legitimate tort claims have
been or will be paid. Suirely some I envi-
ronl iclita lai c lain< ii st have Cgone
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unpaid in many bankruptcies or -
more accurately - tihe taxpayers
have paid the cost.
BuL where is the evidence of a
"problen?" Manville and Robins are
sports - highly unusual cases. The
samIe iS true where debtors Were driven
into bankruptcy because of environi-
mental liabilities. Are we to design our
law based on a handful of anecdotes? I
would make a small wager that if one
Clipped into a random selection of
business bankruptcies, one would find
that the losses fall principally on finalll-
cial and other contract creditors, on
the federal go einlenl (for unpaid
taxes), and only in the rarest of the
rare, on tort claimants and the like.
Moreover, recent research suggests
that secured credit is less pervasive than
some think it to be. Prolessor Ronald
Malln has siggested somne of the reia-
sons why creditors decline to insist on
secCurit) and why debtors resist giving it.
The data that I have collected from
the CoMLpustat data base financial
dlaU on nearly all Americall illic
compalies) show that the median
American company hls gr anted securi-
tv in less than 5 percent of its assets.
Those same data show that in I 195
less than 20 percent ol'all American
pulIlic companies have granted sccuri-
t)' in as mLch as one-if th ol their
assets. In 1995, only 3 perccnt of
American companics had granted
security in More thanhlf ol their
assets. Far [roin being the hoogie man
that gobbles u ) every icC asset, secui-
ty interests o- anly kind are only inlrc-
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quently granted 1b), a typical American
public firm. Mann's research suggests
that personal property security is also
less pervasive in private firms than
might be thought. One would expect
that the percentage of secured debt
would rise as a company edges toward
insolvency but even in bankrup)tcy I
know of no data that suggest that the
principal creditors are secured.
In a free society, parties who wish to
impose restraints on alienation (that is,
restraints on what a debtor can do with
its oVn property) shoul bear the bur-
den of showing why the debtor's free-
dom is to be restricted. The advocates
of the set-aside proposal should be
made to show that at a minimnum, Arti-
cle 9 is or will be used to stiff tort
claimants, employees and others and
that the cost to these injuIred parties
outtweighs the benelits of allowing the
debtor to exercise its free will in the
use of its own assets.
That case has niot been made and I
doubt that it can be.
Understand first what the carve-out
will mot do, Since the carve-otit is an
amendment to Article 9 (dealing only
with security interests in personalty) it
does not cover real estate mortgages or
the priority of.judicial or mechanics liens.
It would also not atleCt Securiti:ation or a
whole range of other modern and
ancient non-Allicle Q sctirit) devices
such as consignmenis. Only' in the rarest
cases - \\vhere there are unpaid tort
claimants or their ilk and \\,here the
assets are personal p~ropery otherwise
completely absorbed by a personal prop-
city Secutrity interest - Will tile propos-
al reward its intended beneficiaries.
Moreover, it is (Ituite possible that
junior secured creditors and unsecured
contract creditors will use the proposal
and so shove the intended beneficiaries
away from the trough. Thus, if there is
a iproblem, I doubt this is the solution.
The proper solution would be to ask
Congress to atmnend the Bankruptcy
Code or to enact other federal law to
grant specific beneficiaries priority over
specific persons. This is the pattern of
the civil law in some cotntries. Federal
law would do what an amendment to
Article 9 cannot do: ptit all sectired
creditors (creditors secured iUnder Arti-
cle 9, real estate mlortgagees and lessors
et al.) and other claimants in the same
position vis-a-vis the particular favored
claimants. Moreover federal legislation
cotild make a more reasoned and more
explicit detenrination about who
should benefit from stich a proposal
and who should suffer its consequtences.
The advocates of the proposal do not
favor a federal law perhaps because they'
believe they cannot get Congress to
adopt one. If Congress is satisfied with
the modest priorities now given in Sec-
tion 507(a) to employees and the like
and is content to allow tort claimants to
have priority' only' to the extetnt of instur-
ance and not more, where is the Virtue
in a rule in Article 9 to the contrary?
At least in the short rull, the 1ro-
t-osal would increase the cost of
secured credit in personal propcrty.
ConcCivably' some who would now
lend it 8 peicent would dem1and 9 per-
cent in the proposed regime. Others
might refuse Marginal debtors who
now get credit. On the other hand, if
the timbler of tort and employee cred-
itors who use the set aside prove small
(and if Unintended beneficiaries like
jtunior secired creditors can be exelcld-
ed), it might have a modest long-range
effect on secured lending.
If I Understand the proposal correct-
ly, the unintended beneficiaries are a
significant probleth the proposal
favors anyone with a judicial lien, not
just nonadjusting creditors with liens.
In setting their fees, senior secured
creditors would have to be concerned
not just about the torts or environmen-
tal contamination of its debtor, but also
about junior secured creditors and
other contract creditors. I suspect that
junior secured creditors and other
financial contract creditors arc the
most vigilant and would be the most
likely to use the provision. If that is
how the hand play's out, the enactment
of the set aside will have turned the
priority rules of Article 9 upside down
for rio apparent reason.
As I read him, Professor Wovodward
would not endorse stich an outcome
but would presumably say that a prior
perfected secured creditor should be
stiperior not only to unsecurecd contract
creditors, but event more so to junior
secured creditors - all of whom have
bargained for a junior position (and
presinably charged accordingly).
'[he proposal might also disruipt the
priorities in bankruptcy First it would
allow the trustee in bankrluptcy (a lien
creditor under Section 544) to take tip
to 20 percent of a sectired creditors
collateral In every bankriptcy.
Depending on jttdicial interpretation
and on how the law was written, it
might also upset current rules onl pref-
erences, fratidulen conveyances and
law ol federal tax liens.
The proposal Would drive some
secured creditors to more expensive
but More certain foris of secur'ity such
as real estate mortgages, consignments,
securitization and the like.
In short, the proposal would int ro-
dLice significant tInceltainty into secired
lending tunler Article 9. Ultimately one
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would expect secured creditors to mea-
sure and calculate the amotunt of that
uncertainty and to alter their behavior
accordingly They might alter it by refus-
ing to lend, by raising their interest rates,
or in some cases by taking a for of
security other than Article 9 securit)y
Ahlhough I cannot prove it, I suspect
that the change so induced would be
inefficient - even after the initial
uncertainty subsided. A proposal of this
kind is efficient only if the added costs
that are imposed on the system and
passed on by the secured creditors are
justifieCd by offsetting reductions in cost
or by gains to unsecured creditors. In
theory the beneficiaries (junior secutrCd
creditors, unsecured creditors and non-
adjusting creditors), should be willing to
lend at a lower price. II that does not
prove to be true, the proposal \Will be
inefficient - unless of course the value
of other gains to the nonad justing credi-
tors eC(luals or exceeds the cost of higher
interest charges and declining credit.
A second cost - one only indi-
rectly related to efficiency - is the
political cost arising from the govern-
ment's interference with a dcebtors free
use of its own property Although the
proposal is characterized only as a
"carve-out," it is in fact a restraint on
alienation, a restriction on the power
of an owner to dispose of its own
property as it pleases. I at least regard
every' governmental restriction on citi-
zens' freedom as costly
In conclusion, I suspect that
secured creditors could live with
almost any' modification of Article L)
that can be imagined - this one
inclded. I also suspect that this pro-
posal would cause substantial short-
term inefficiencies and that it might
produce long-erni inelficiencies.
There is even a possibility of signili-
call, unilellded consequences -
namely of the Proposals use principal-
ly' )y junior secured creditors to
achieve priority that has been explicit-
ly denied them under Article 9. That,
of course, would be (uite perverse -
to elevate a person who had filed sec-
ond over the one who had filed first,
simply because the sCcond hurries io
court and gets a judglenlt.
So, I oppose this scheme mostly on
the ground that the proponents have
not yet made a case for it. Where -
I)eyond a populist craving for a petit
bourgcois valhalla - is the political
justif ication Ior such a restriction on the
Use of private property? Where -
beyond anecdotes - is the evidence
showing injury to tort claimants, envi-
ronnienrtl claimants, employees and the
like? I dloubt there is any' stich evidence
or any' satisfactory political rationale.
If there is none, no problni.
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